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Conference Report, 12th Annual Conference on European 
Tort Law, 4 April to 6 April 2013, Vienna, Austria
THOMAS THIEDE & ANDREW BELL*
After some warm words of welcome from the dignitaries of the Austrian Ministry 
of Justice, the conference began, as the conference always does, with a keynote 
lecture by a luminary of the tort law world. This year, the former president of the 
Austrian Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof (OGH)), Irmgard Griss, delivered 
the lecture on the enthralling topic ‘How Judges Think - Judicial Reasoning in 
Tort Cases from a Comparative Perspective’. Griss based her observations most 
convincingly on judgments handed down in four major jurisdictions, namely 
Austria, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In essence, she pursued the 
question whether judges disguise their ‘political’ considerations as legal 
considerations. Alongside, and closely connected with, the aforementioned 
question, she addressed whether judges are entitled, or even obliged, to develop 
the law; are judges, as Montesquieu had it, merely la bouche de la loi or, to quote 
Blackstone, the living oracles of the law?
Of course, Griss was quick to stress the importance of culture; judges do 
not live in an ivory tower and their thinking is shaped by their immediate 
environment, their training, their (legal) role model(s), and their legal cultures - 
and at the same time they create and shape the legal culture of a state (at times 
arguably even unknowingly). According to Griss, this all becomes most obvious in 
tort cases where fact patterns are most closely intertwined with human nature, for 
example, when a judge has to address a person’s negligence. Confronted with the 
strikingly simple example of wrongful birth, all those attending agreed almost 
immediately.
Pursuing her research question, Griss first addressed the idea of the need, 
or even the duty, to provide sufficient reasons for a judgment. In her experience, 
judges often act out of their intuition. Nevertheless, she held, it is one of the 
judge’s responsibilities to make the appropriateness and justice of the decision at 
hand clear to the parties involved; it is an essential aspect of the right to a fair 
trial and is thus not only a matter of national law but also of human rights as 
enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and democracy 
as such. First, the judge needs to explain his or her judgment to the parties in 
order to gain their acceptance. By engaging the agreement of the citizens through 
persuasive judicial reasoning, the judiciary respects the citizens’ role as the core 
of democratic government. Second, by such reasoning and the inherent need to
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justify the decision, judges are at the same time restrained from any arbitrary 
misuse of their power. Griss, continuing, drew some first conclusions by 
comparing the aforementioned jurisdictions from the perspective of the need to 
give reasons. Different styles of judgments may further or hinder the publication 
of the decisive reasoning and are good indicators of how judges think. Whereas in 
the United Kingdom, where judges tend to provide individual opinions, 
extensively reasoned judgments, and thus the development of the law, are 
encouraged by this style, French judgments in particular are formalist; judgments 
mostly state only whether a provision has been correctly interpreted by the lower 
court - no legal doctrine or previous cases are discussed nor any explanation 
given why a certain legal principle is applied. As a consequence, Griss found, 
judges have wide discretion, especially as their names are not provided in the said 
judgments. To some extent, Austrian and German courts are also stuck in rigid 
stylistic formalism; the legal rule is the major concern, the facts the minor one, 
and thus the conclusion obvious - judges hide behind the product of this 
syllogism, furthered by the overly impersonal language of their decisions. In 
summary, UK judges state overtly what they think, French judges are silent about 
their motives, and Austrian and German judges tend to use legal doctrine as both 
shield and weapon at the same time.
These observations were helpful for Griss’ second research question about 
whether judges are obliged or even entitled to develop law. For the United 
Kingdom, the answer is obvious, as the whole system is based on the willingness 
of the judges, particularly in the Supreme Court, to develop law. In France, a 
virtually identical result is achieved, however, not by overly extensive rulings but 
by the total freedom of judges from the need to provide a foundation or reason for 
any change to the legal system. Finally, in Austria and Germany, legal 
development by judges may not seem that obvious, but it is even accepted by the 
legislator, especially in situations where a political consensus cannot be achieved. 
This led Griss to the conclusion that differences in style do not necessarily reflect 
differences in the commitment to, or the results of, legal development by the 
judiciary. As judges strive everywhere to arrive at fair and appropriate decisions, 
they almost inevitably do develop the law.
Griss did not end her keynote there, but added her personal observations as a 
president of a supreme court. She encouraged judges to be active but not activists, as 
they should always respect the boundaries inherent in their task. Judges should be 
aware of their thought patterns and set of values in order to keep a critical distance 
away from persuasions, positions, beliefs, and preconceptions. Further, indeed, they 
should disclose the real motives leading to a judgment. In her opinion, one essential 
part in all of this would be the language used in judgments. She asked for a 
heightened sensitivity to and overall clarity of the language used. She described two 
questions as helpful in this regard: What exactly does that mean? And: Wherefrom do 
I know this? In any case, only those arguments that the judge is willing to disclose in 
his or her judgment should be taken into account.
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The lecture triggered an excited discussion, only two points from which 
will be reiterated here. Starting with a question from Lucian Bojin (Romania), the 
relationship between the law and the parties, with the judge as intermediary, 
came into focus: Griss answered Solomon-like that the judge will, at the same 
time, look up to the law and look down to the parties. The essential point is that, 
even if one agrees that judges rule according to their feelings towards one or 
other of the parties, even the facts taken as relevant (and the judge’s resulting 
emotional distance or closeness) are inevitably shaped by that judge’s legal 
knowledge. On a remark by Christiane Wendehorst (University of Vienna), Griss 
emphasized that Germanistic scholastics are a hindrance to better judgments. 
Indeed, that legal education must be changed, which is not easily achieved. 
Nevertheless, legal education must establish that providing motives and decisive 
reasons in judgments is no weakness, but rather a judicial strength.
The real bread and butter of the conference, and its unique addition to the 
world of tort law scholarship, comes on the Friday, when reports are delivered 
from every jurisdiction within the European Union (EU) along with a number of 
additional non-Member States. Reporters, respected national scholars in their own 
right, are asked to give a brief overview of the developments within their system 
in the previous year. It would be overly optimistic to try and reflect in a few short 
paragraphs the rich diversity of material that, as with every year, was presented 
for 2012, but attention will be drawn here to some of the authors’ personal 
favourites.
In Austria, Barbara C. Steininger showed the OGH yet again extending 
compensation for mental shock caused by information about the life-threatening 
injury of a primary victim. Previously, such compensation had only been awarded 
to the secondary victim in cases involving the death of the primary victim. 
However, the OGH carefully carved out some distinct prerequisites for liability, 
namely the requirement of acute peril to the primary victim’s life or concrete 
danger of permanent nursing care dependency of the primary victim and highly 
dangerous conduct on the part of the tortfeasor in respect of the secondary victim.
In Belgium, where courts have a reputation for extremely slow court 
procedures, Isabelle Durant showed that, as a result of legislation prompted by a 
pipeline accident, courts will now be replaced in cases of technological 
catastrophes of great extent (i.e., with more than four victims). Here, the Belgian 
motor insurance fund will - without the need to establish legal liability - step in 
and provide damages additional to social security payments.
Viktor Tokushev presented a case involving a personality right’s 
infringement for Bulgaria. A reader’s letter published in a newspaper contained 
slanderous and offensive allegations about the claimant. An action was brought 
against the publisher of the newspaper on the basis of vicarious liability, which 
was accepted by the Bulgarian Supreme Court. The decision met fierce criticism,
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as no ‘assignment of a task’ by the publisher (the relevant statutory test)1 could be 
assumed and such a broad interpretation of the law carries the danger of serious 
abuses, especially with a view to Internet websites.
For the Czech Republic, a disagreement between the Czech Constitutional 
Court and Supreme Court was presented by Jiri Hradek. In an apartment owned 
by the claimants, an under-floor heating pipe burst, resulting in damage to the 
whole apartment. However, the claimants did not restore the apartment to the 
original condition, making alterations to undamaged parts of the apartment. 
The Constitutional Court had held in an earlier case involving a car accident and 
the subsequent replacement of a car with a new one that any windfall profit on the 
part of the victim is justified, as a car that had undergone repair work would 
generally be of lower value than before. The Supreme Court dismissed this finding 
and held in the apartment case that the claimant is only entitled to the actual cost 
of repairs.
Political changes regarding access to justice were the theme of the 
presentation by Annette Morris for England and Wales. Previously, the Labour 
government abolished legal aid for the majority of personal injury claims and 
instead extended conditional fee (no-win, no-fee) agreements. Accordingly, a 
winning claimant was able to recover his or her lawyer’s fee, the lawyer’s success 
fee, and the after-the-event insurance premium from the losing defendant. Losing 
claimants would use their after-the-event insurance policy to pay the defendant’s 
legal costs and had no liability to pay their own lawyer. As a result, in order to 
claim compensation, claimants only had to pay the cost of the after-the-event 
insurance, which was often even absorbed or paid upfront by their lawyers. As is 
generally known, this system was critically reviewed in 2010 by Sir Rupert 
Jackson, who recommended that neither success fees nor after-the-event 
insurance premiums should be recoverable and, moreover, that success fees 
should instead be paid from the claimant’s damages. The Conservative-LibDem 
coalition elected in May 2010 made the implementation of Jackson’s proposals a 
priority, as politicians took the view that the system had become too claimant 
friendly. In the face of substantial concerns raised by claimant lawyers, trade 
unions, consumer organizations, and academics, the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders (LASPO) Bill was enacted in May 2012. It remains for 
future Annual Conferences on European Tort Law to show whether the concerns 
raised, namely over an overall reduction in access to justice, the creation of 
inequality of arms, and potential under-settlement of claims, will be realized. In 
any case, the presentation featured a more than interesting snapshot of the 
politics surrounding the tort system.
1 See Art. 49 of the Bulgarian Law on Obligations and Contracts: ‘He who has assigned any task to 
another person is liable for the damages inflicted by the latter in or in connection with 
performing the said task’ .
1362
Points on access to justice - from a civilian angle - were raised by the 
report by Irene Kull on Estonia. Here, a new State Fees Act was implemented, 
considerably lowering the rates of state fees charged for filing an action.
The theme of violation of personality rights was then revisited by the 
German report from Florian Wagner-von Papp. As a result of the famous Lebach 
judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in 
Germany, case and press reports about criminal investigations and convictions 
generally only use the initials of names to protect the suspect's or convict's 
personality rights. The court demanded a balancing of the freedom of the press 
and the broadcast media with the suspect's personality rights on a case-by-case 
basis. Only when an overarching and legitimate public interest exists can the 
publication of names be justified. In recent years, German courts have repeatedly 
struggled with the balancing exercise, as the Lebach judgment provides rather 
vague guidelines. That said, the case presented involved the sons of a well-known 
German actor, who were part of a group that demolished flower beds and a 
telephone booth on 1 May, a night during which practical jokes have some 
tradition in Germany. Lower courts had granted the sons injunctions against press 
reports providing the full names of the suspects. The Constitutional Court 
quashed the judgment, as the lower courts had considered the fact that only petty 
crime was involved and that the perpetrators were juveniles as an automatic bar 
against publishing their names. The court stressed that the factors need to be 
balanced on a case-by-case basis. As the juveniles themselves were singers and 
actors, and as such had sought the limelight, and only petty crime was involved, 
any stigmatizing effect and thus the gravity of reputational loss was limited. 
Hence, their names could be published.
For Ireland, Eoin Quill reported a rare case of misfeasance in public office. 
In an investigation regarding an alleged child abuse, the investigating officers 
deliberately failed to comply with constitutional disclosure obligations and misled 
the plaintiff's employer as to the level of risk, as well as other agencies about the 
veracity of the allegations. It was held by the court that the misfeasance in 
question can be by way of targeted malice and by knowledge of lack of authority 
and probability of injury to the plaintiff. For the latter, recklessness will suffice.
For Italy, Elena Bargelli submitted that the Corte de Cassazione finally 
reversed its original view denying any claim by a congenitally disabled child 
following mistakes in prenatal diagnosis. In the reported judgment, it was 
affirmed that, in cases of mistaken prenatal diagnosis and consequent wrongful 
birth, both parents and even the child are entitled to damages. Denying the 
child’s claims (based on the ‘right not to be born’) is now seen as illogical and 
unacceptable.
Giannino Caruana Demajo presented a case of joint liability for Malta. The 
plaintiff had intervened to stop a quarrel between the first defendant and his wife, 
was attacked by the first defendant, and hit in the eye with a brick. The second 
defendant joined in and hit the plaintiff on the back of his head with a metal
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chair. The plaintiff lost his sight in one eye, caused by the strike with the brick, 
while the blow with the chair arguably did not cause any permanent damage. The 
liability of the first defendant was not in doubt. However, due to the lack of 
causation, the action against the second defendant was denied by the lower courts. 
The Court of Appeal disagreed and held that joint liability is given when the 
defendants act with a common purpose and are accomplices in the incident taken 
as a whole and not necessarily in the specific act that caused the damage. Only 
when the defendant acted without malice is his or her liability limited to such part 
of the damage as he or she may have caused. This judgment may not come as a 
surprise for many continental lawyers. Nevertheless, from a comparative 
perspective, two points are highly interesting. First, this was found in a common 
law hybrid system, and second, the judgment was based on comparative 
observations on Article 1049 of the Austrian Allgemeines Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch.
In Norway, a case presented by Magne Strandberg of high school bullying 
had made its way to the Supreme Court. Fellow class members exposed a pupil to 
prolonged bullying for his first five years at a local authority school. Years later, 
he developed a serious mental illness that eventually forced him to drop out of 
further studies and rendered him unfit for any employment. As no contractual 
basis for his claim was available, the claimant based his action on vicarious 
liability. For this, however, Norwegian tort law foresees liability only where the 
action of one employee results in damage. Here, a group of employees, i.e., 
teachers, headmasters, and the psychological-pedagogical service, omitted to 
grant the necessary help in the school. Hence, the liability of the school’s owner 
was in question. The Norwegian Supreme Court held the school’s owner liable on 
the doctrine of cumulative mistakes. The court held that in cases where no single 
employee made a mistake severe enough to qualify for negligence, the sum of 
mistakes made by several employees suffices for a claim in negligence. It should 
not be omitted here that in discussion several speakers noted that from their 
perspective an organizational fault on the part of the school’s owner was present 
and that he would thus be liable in any case.
In Poland, the Polish Supreme Court extended the availability of damages 
for the inability to make use of a car due to its destruction in the course of a road 
traffic accident. Ewa Baginska submitted that, whereas in earlier cases those 
damages were awarded only when the car was in professional use, damages are 
also now available for privately used cars. However, she duly noted that those 
damages are only available when the expenses were, in fact, incurred. Baginska 
also discussed a case involving the enforcement of a foreign judgment awarding 
punitive damages. A weekly magazine infringed the personality rights of the 
daughter of a well-known politician running for presidency. Domiciled in the 
United States, the daughter and her husband filed for compensation and punitive 
damages in a US court. The jury awarded USD 1,000,000 in compensatory 
damages and an additional USD 4,000,000 as punitive damages in a default
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judgment. The claimants now filed for enforcement in Polish courts. The courts 
denied such enforcement on the basis that, first, the award for non-pecuniary loss 
was exorbitant in light of established case law and, second, punitive damages are 
not available in Polish law and the award would thus clearly violate public policy. 
As a result, the judgment was not enforced and the claimants were left with an 
earlier, pre-trial settlement figure of USD 4,500. It must be noted from the 
discussion that the magazine was widely available in the United States, but the 
company had no branch office there.
In Portugal, a case involving arguably dangerous slides in water parks 
emerged. Against the advice of the water park, the claimant changed position 
onto his knees during descent and then to lying with his head forward. As a result 
of this, he gained considerable speed and was not slowed down when entering the 
end of the slide. His impact was brutal and he was rendered quadriplegic. 
Subsequently, he sued the owner and operators on the basis that the damage 
resulted from deficient maintenance of the slide, namely inadequate water levels 
in the means used to slip into the pool. As the operation of a waterslide is 
considered a dangerous activity and the fault of the operators would be presumed, 
the legal question was whether the obvious fault of the claimant would result in 
the denial of liability. The Portuguese Supreme Court answered in the affirmative: 
‘The presumption of fault is not established to be a perversion to impose 
inadequate and unfair duties on the shoulders of the explorers of dangerous 
activities’ . Indeed, as duly noted by Filippa Almeno de Sa, it would be entirely 
inadequate if a person who had placed himself voluntarily and culpably in a 
situation of danger, in clear violation of the rules of utilization of the slide, could 
blame the defendants, who had taken all necessary measures to prevent precisely 
that situation.
For Scotland, Martin Hogg presented two contradictory cases on the 
interpretation of statutes in cases of transmission of delictual liability. The legal 
question in each case was whether liability in delict for asbestos-related 
mesothelioma transferred from a now defunct local authority to its successor. In 
both cases, the deceased had worked for local authorities and were exposed to 
asbestos. Both workers died of mesothelioma and the families sued for damages. 
In the first case, the relevant statutory provision for the successor authority at 
which the claim was directed stated that ‘all rights liabilities, and 
obligations . . . shall . . .  be transferred to and vest in the new authority’ , whereas 
in the second case the statutory provision did not mention obligations and read 
that liabilities were vested in the successor authority. The difficulty at hand was 
that, at the relevant date, there had been injuria (the negligent exposure to 
asbestos) but as yet no damnum  (as at the time of exposure no harm was suffered 
by the deceased). Was this enough to give rise to a ‘liability’ or an ‘obligation’? In 
the first judgment, it was held that in the context of the legislative provision 
liability and obligation did not mean the same thing; any obligation would require 
both injuria and damnum , but for liability it was necessary to have only injuria.
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Hence, the successor authority was liable. In the second judgment, it was held 
that liability meant a party being bound or obliged to do something, and for any 
liability (i.e., obligation) to exist, again, there had to be a concurrence of injuria 
and damnum, which was not given in the case at hand. As no obligation was in 
existence at the time of transmission, the local authority did not inherit any 
liability of its predecessor towards the deceased/the family. Given these arguably 
contradictory judgments dealing with contingent obligations, the reader is asked 
to be patient and wait until the appeal launched against the later decision is 
decided. The result will most likely be presented at next year’s conference.
In Spain, the result of more fierce fights regarding the virtues of 
intellectual property and the delicate weighing of interests in cases concerning 
personality rights were made obvious by Albert Ruda. A blogger had dubbed the 
general society of authors and editors ‘thieves’ and provided his readers with 
knowledge about so-called Google bombs, by which the website of the society 
would be hyperlinked with the word ‘thief. A multitude of hyperlinks with the 
wording came into existence and the society sued the blogger in an action for 
violation of honour. At first sight, the requirements for such an action were 
satisfied, especially as the blogger had actual knowledge and intention regarding 
the result. Nevertheless, the courts denied liability, as free speech, public 
interest, and the honour of the society needed to be balanced. It was submitted 
that the society had already faced a huge amount of criticism in the preceding 
years, and thus the wording, though seeming inappropriate when considered in 
isolation, was not so when seen in the general public context. As the reputation of 
the society was considerably lowered to start with, a further reduction by the 
blogger was not proven. As a result, the blogger was not liable.
With regard to developments in tort law in the EU, Bernhard A. Koch 
chose the case of Folien Fischer v. Ritama SpA for his splendid presentation. In 
this case, the Italian company Ritrama claimed that the Swiss Folien Fischer AG 
and its (likewise Swiss) sister company Fofitec AG illegitimately refused to grant 
certain patent licences to Ritrama in violation of competition law. The two Swiss 
addressees of these allegations subsequently brought an action against Ritrama in 
Hamburg, Germany, for a negative declaration effectively stating that the 
defendant had no claim against Folien Fischer or Fofitec in tort or delict. Both 
the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal dismissed the action as 
inadmissible for lack of international jurisdiction in Germany. The German 
Federal Supreme Court stayed proceedings and asked the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) for a preliminary ruling, essentially on the question 
whether Article 5, No. 3 Brussels I Regulation provides special jurisdiction in 
proceedings for (negative) declaratory relief. The Court answered that question in 
the affirmative. The effects of the ruling may not be overestimated, as a side effect 
may be an almost inevitable rupture in the European system of competent courts; 
the CJEU gave the starting signal for a race to the court in those cases where it 
makes a difference, despite the Rome II Regulation, in which jurisdiction the
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matter is decided. Koch argued convincingly that whoever makes it first to the 
doorstep of the most attractive court will effectively be able to cut off access to 
the other forum. Such forum shopping will now almost inevitably result in all 
cases where Article 28 Rome II Regulation applies and was already apparent in 
the case at hand; why did the two Swiss companies (and not their German 
subsidiary) file suit in Germany against an Italian company, thereby not including 
the latter's Swiss subsidiary, which was apparently the only one active in the 
German market?
Of course, one of the highlights of the Friday session is the concluding 
Comparative Summary, this year again delivered by Ken Oliphant, Director of the 
Institute for European Tort Law, highlighting common themes and making the 
often needed links with developments in previous years. For 2012, Oliphant 
identified four general topics for closer scrutiny, the first being claims for 
wrongful life. Oliphant held that such claims have been a leitmotif of the Annual 
Conference since almost its very first year. In fact, it was the year before the 
conference began (i.e., the year 2000) when the French Cour de Cassation handed 
down its judgment in the now notorious Perruche case. However, already at the 
second Annual Conference the audience was to learn that the French legislator 
had intervened and reversed Perruche by statute. Over the following years, a 
contradictory picture came into existence: courts in Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and Spain proceeded to allow claims for wrongful life, whereas the majority of the 
European legal systems reject such claims. A development to be noted for 2012 is 
the change in Italy, where - as mentioned above - the law now in fact allows 
claims for wrongful life. A second paradigm mapped out by Oliphant was 
problems of causal uncertainty, i.e., cases where a precise causal link between 
damage and wrongful action is difficult to establish. The classic example of 
mesothelioma was presented for Scotland by Martin Hogg and is mentioned 
above; other cases were presented for the Netherlands and Hungary. Oliphant 
highlighted the range of different legal techniques that are used to overcome the 
practical impossibility of proving the necessary causal link, including reversal of 
the burden of proof, proportional liability for contribution to risk, and damages 
for loss of chance.2 The third overarching topic singled out by Oliphant was 
mental harm to secondary victims. He addressed the above-mentioned cases of 
Austria, Greece, and Switzerland and described thoughtfully the boundaries of any 
liability enclosing claims of people who are only remotely connected with the 
accident for which the tortfeasor is responsible. The fourth and final comparison 
was drawn for torts for violating privacy. As the learned reader knows, this 
question has traditionally been addressed differently in almost every European 
jurisdiction. Referring to cases presented for Finland and Germany, Oliphant
2 The same problem is addressed by a new study, ‘Proportional Liability: Analytical and 
Comparative Perspectives’ , in Israel Gilead, Mike D. Green, Bernhard A Koch (eds), published by 
deGruyter on behalf of the ECTIL/Institute for European Tort Law, 2013.
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noted, however, the now well-established trend towards the incremental 
harmonization of national approaches, prompted in particular by the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.
As always, the entirety of the Saturday session was given over to 
examination of a single topic by a select group of commentators. This year's 
timely chosen theme was Tort Law and the Financial Crisis.
Ernst Karner, Deputy Director of the Institute for European Tort Law, 
gave a first insight into the topic, presenting the basic questions at hand. In his 
presentation, he singled out several main players and addressed tort law issues 
accordingly. First, the main originator of the financial crisis, banking institutions 
and their risky and unsustainable market behaviour, was given close examination. 
Karner dutifully explained the role of Collateral Debt Obligations (CDOs) and 
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBSs) in the crisis, especially the 
resulting domino effect leading to the breakdown of the housing market in the 
United States. However, the resulting damage would not have been so enormous 
but for the failures of the rating agencies, which were then also addressed, as 
their support for highly hazardous financial market behaviour and the 
downplaying and soft-selling of the risks at hand misled not only their customers 
but also society at large. Finally, Karner introduced the discussion of liabilities of 
supervisory agencies, as they failed to provide the necessary safeguard against the 
reckless behaviour of the other actors.
The scene having been set, Peter Loser stood to discuss the liability of 
banking institutions. His paper will not be reiterated in detail here, but, 
nevertheless, it became very clear that tort law in its current form could only 
contribute in a rather limited way to handling the enormous damage the 
sub-prime collapse and financial crisis brought forth. Even if no-fault liability was 
assumed for investment products, due to the manifold issues regarding causation 
tort law cannot offer a substantial controlling function in order to prevent such 
damaging behaviour by banking institutions in the future.
Following this, Alessandro Scarso was asked to discuss the liability of 
rating agencies for their erroneous ratings. Rating agencies cannot be liable 
merely because their ratings were wrong and did not predict the future correctly, 
but because they severely fell short of those procedural standards that are simply 
indispensable for the making of a well-founded prognosis. In essence, two 
constellations had to be distinguished: liability towards subscribers to rating 
publications and liability towards third parties. If the loss-suffering investors had 
subscribed to the rating agency's publications, damages could be based on 
contractual liability. More obstacles have to be cleared if a responsibility towards 
third parties is at stake. Not even the basis of such a liability is resolved - is it 
contractual, tortuous, or quasi-contractual (and thus in-between)? Indeed, who is 
protected if such liability exists at all? Scarso addressed all of these points.
Donal Nolan rendered the final topical report on the liability of supervisory 
authorities. His conclusion, based on extensive comparative research, was in the
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negative: the special protection often afforded to financial supervisors by 
legislators and conceptual obstacles standing in the path of legal redress in 
respect of supervisory failure result in a very low chance of successful actions for 
damage, whichever legal system is under scrutiny.
The esteemed Jaap Spier gave the final lecture, arguing that tort law is not 
the answer to the current financial crisis. He argued that damages paid in this 
context are eventually taxpayers’ money, and thus that actions in tort would just 
slip the money from one pocket into another. Instead, he envisaged a broader 
scope for legislation regarding crises like climate change and financial 
disturbances. He accused actors in the legal, financial, political, and insurance 
arenas of remarkable stubbornness and denial of reality. In his opinion, today’s 
paradigm of short-term profits must be changed and decisive action finally taken 
nationally and internationally, formally and informally.
As always, a brief summary of proceedings at the Annual Conference is no 
substitute for the rich and rewarding final efforts of those national reporters 
published in the accompanying European Tort Law Yearbook. Case abstracts will 
subsequently be available in the European Tort Law database at 
www.eurotort.org. Furthermore, the papers from the special session, along with a 
revised version of the opening lecture, will be published during the course of
2013 in the Journal o f  European Tort Law  (JETL).
Next year’s Annual Conference will take place from 24 April to 26 April
2014 in Vienna. All materials from the last conference as well as information on 
the next conference are available a twww.acet.ectil.org.
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